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On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban 
Resurgence in Afghanistan 
Thomas H. Johnson* 
ABSTRACT  
This article attempts to delve into the morass that is developing for American and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. Only through a proper understanding of the motivations and 
multiple identities that the Taliban lays claim to can their rapidly-growing insurgency be 
defeated and peace reestablished. By examining the historical and tribal facets of the 
insurgency, the nature of the Taliban is laid bare. This understanding is absolutely critical 
if the U.S. and NATO hope to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. 
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Introduction 
In May 2003, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that 
the war in Afghanistan was in a “cleanup” phase1. Now, four years after 
Rumsfeld’s statement and five and a half years since the conclusion of 
major Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) combat operations, it is clear 
that Afghanistan is anything but a stable and secure country. Indeed, the 
situation in Afghanistan has become extremely volatile. The Taliban is 
mounting a significant insurgent campaign against a regime that has not 
delivered on the expectations of the Afghan people. The new era of 
                                                      
* Thomas H. Johnson is a Research Professor of the Department of National Security 
Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is also the Director 
of NPS's Program on the Study of Culture and Conflict. The author would like to thank 
Alec Metz and Jarad Van Wagoner for their invaluable assistance in the development of 
this article as well as two anonymous reviewers for their comments. The article also 
benefited tremendously from the author's discussions as well intellectual exchanges with 
Chris Mason. Mr. Mason helped shape the author's views on a number of critical issues as 
well as the presentation style of this article. He should be viewed as a silent coauthor. 
Portions of this article were delivered as lectures to the Commonwealth Club San 
Francisco, California, November 16, 2006, entitled “Five Years after the Taliban: Is This 
Democracy and Stability?” and the World Affairs Council, Monterey California, May 16, 
2007 entitled “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Running with the Hare and Hunting with 
the Hounds?”. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s own and should not be 
construed as an official position or policy of the US Government, Department of Defense 
or Naval Postgraduate School. 
1 Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘War on Terrorism in ‘Cleanup’ Phase,’’ Washington Times, May 2 
2003 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go1637/is_200305/ai_n7511726> (April 4 2005). 
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stability that was expected after the fall of the Taliban has disappeared. 
Afghanistan is now embroiled in an intense, violent, and growing 
insurgency. Faced with a resurgent Taliban, criticism over epidemic 
levels of corruption, lack of development, and rampant crime, 
Afghanistan is a mess.  
While American and world attention focuses on Iraq, the situation in 
Afghanistan over the past three years has so deteriorated that the shaky 
American and NATO coalition risk losing the war against the Taliban. 
To make matters worse, for reasons to be explored in this article, Afghan 
President Harmid Karzai has warned that Afghans’ patience with foreign 
troops is wearing thin.2   Finally to add insult to injury, Afghanistan’s 
economy has been captured by opium production and trafficking.  
This dire situation is not inevitable; through a better understanding of 
the situation on the ground, and a corresponding shift in military tactics 
– if pursued immediately and with vigor – the United States, its NATO 
partners and their related aid and development organizations can reverse 
the course of the Taliban resurgence and bring peace to Afghanistan. The 
greatest threat to Afghanistan is not leftover munitions, al-Qaeda, or even 
narcotrafficking; these are merely symptoms of the real problems. 
Afghanistan faces a lack of control in the countryside by Kabul regime, 
its international supporters and its internal security forces and the failure 
to reconstruct the Afghan economy and infrastructure. The Afghan 
population’s expectations have not been met. 
In the absence of security and development, the Taliban threat is not 
going to diminish. The Taliban’s presence is particularly pronounced in 
the south and east of the country, most notably Kandahar, and Helmand 
but also Zabul, Paktika and Paktya (among others); these provinces have 
experienced intensified Taliban activity, including attacks on coalition 
forces as well as the actual establishment of Taliban “shadow 
governments.”  These provinces have two key similarities: first, they 
border Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) or 
Pakistan’s border provinces of Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier 
Province (NWFP), where Taliban commanders have allegedly found 
sanctuary. Secondly, these provinces are in the middle of the traditional 
Pashtun tribal homeland that has witnessed virtually no meaningful 
reconstruction since the United States and their Northern Alliance 
partners drove the Taliban from power in December 2001. 
The purpose of this article is three-fold; first it will present a general 
overview of the present situation in Afghanistan and then examine a 
number of critical dynamics for the emergent Taliban. Specifically the 
article will explore the implications of adjacency to Pakistan of critical 
Afghan border provinces for the Taliban. It will then assess implications 
                                                      
2 Noor Rahman, “Afghans dispute U.S. version of raid casualties,” Reuters, May 30 2007, 
<www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSISL25509820070530> (May 20 2007). 




of the lack of reconstruction in these same provinces for the insurgency. 
The article will also address a series of other critical aspects of the on-
going conflict in Afghanistan to include the implications of collateral 
damage to both the staying power of the Karzai regime in Kabul as well 
as to the influence of the insurgents with the Afghan population. The 
article will conclude with a discussion of policy options that directly flow 
from the foregoing analysis.  
Whither Taliban? 
According to the U.S. Defense Department, the initial U.S. air campaign 
of OEF that began on October 7, 2001 “eviscerated” the Taliban’s military 
capability within two weeks.3  On October 18, 2001 the air campaign was 
officially joined by a ground campaign when U.S. Special Forces entered 
northern Afghanistan and teamed up with the Northern Alliance – a 
loose confederation of veteran mujahideen and warlords from non-
Pashtun ethnic blocs who represented the Taliban’s primary resistance. 
After only 62 days of conflict the Taliban regime was defeated and the 
United States and their Northern Alliance partner declared victory in 
Afghanistan.  
 The Northern Alliance included no significant Pashtun involvement, 
and was basically regarded by the Pashtun population (42 percent of 
Afghanistan) as a foreign entity. That the coalition whisked first Abdul 
Haq and then Hamid Karzai, prominent Pashtuns, to the fore of the fight 
against the Taliban after 9/11 showed the realization by the coalition that 
no one but a Pashtun could eventually rule Afghanistan. Haq was 
captured on October 25, 2001 by the Taliban and tortured to death; and, of 
course, Karzai went on to assume the presidency. To this day Karzai’s 
cabinet and government still contains many former Northern Alliance 
fighters.4 
The success of the initial campaign against the Taliban was marred 
by two serious mistakes, one diplomatic and one military, which would 
prove to be major strategic blunders for the metaphorical “War on 
Terrorism.”  In mid-November 2001, the Bush Administration permitted 
the Pakistani Air Force to fly out hundreds of Pakistanis encircled in the 
northern city of Kunduz, an evacuation that turned into a mass 
extraction of senior Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel, dubbed “Operation 
Evil Airlift” by appalled U.S. Special Forces personnel on the scene.5  To 
                                                      
3 Romesh Ratnesar, “The New Rules Of Engagement,” Time, November 5 2001,  
<www.time.com/magazine/article/0,9171,1001123,00.html> (April 5 2006). 
4 Such as the Tajik Amrullah Saleh, now head of the National Security Directorate. 
5 Marcus George, “Kunduz celebrates end of siege,” BBC News, November 26 2001, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1677157.stm> (May 23 2007); Michael Moran, 
“The Airlift of Evil,” MSNBC, November 29 2001,  
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many, this revealed the true loyalties of the Pakistani security services, 
and ensured that the fight against the Taliban would continue well into 
the future. To others, the evacuation reflected a necessity in order to 
avoid embarrassing Pakistani President Musharrif who had recently 
become a significant ally in the U.S. War on Terrorism. At the time, 
India issued a statement of protest against the airlift, on the assumption 
that jihadis returned to Pakistan would soon be appearing in Kashmir.6  
Instead we have seen them return en masse to the tribal territories on 
either side of the Afghan-Pak border, further hindering the pacification 
of Afghanistan.7  Then, the following month, the U.S. failed to commit 
ground forces to block the escape route at Tora Bora of Osama bin Laden 
and dozens of his best men who had been encircled near the Afghan-
Pakistan border.8  The opportunity to complete the decisive destruction 
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda before Christmas 2001 was lost.  
After the eventual defeat of the Taliban regime, an interim 
administration was quickly installed in Kabul under the terms of the 
UN-brokered Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Process which was formulated 
in December 2001, while flawed, offered real promise for the country.9  
International attention on Afghanistan remained high, loya jirgas were 
held to help formulate Afghanistan’s political future, and donor countries 
were signing-on to help finance Afghan reconstruction and development. 
Meanwhile, bin Laden and most of the senior al-Qaeda leadership, as well 
as Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and the great majority of the 
senior Taliban cadre, were believed to have taken up residence either in 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or Baluchistan 
Province, where they began to regroup and rearm. While there were 
surely exceptions, the time period from 2002 until spring 2003 saw 
Afghans breathe a collective sigh of relief after 23 years of almost 
continual conflict that had ripped the country as well as its social fabric 
apart.  
The security situation started to deteriorate significantly in 2003 in 
the south and east of the country. With U.S. forces now bogged down 
and overstretched by the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the added 
strain of a continuing low-intensity war in Afghanistan became evident. 
                                                                                                                                                           
<www.msnbc.com/news/664935.asp?0si=-Prior percent20knowledge&cp1=1#BODY> 
(May 23 2007).  
6 Seymour M. Hersh, “The Getaway,” The New Yorker, January 28 2002, p. 36. 
7 Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2007), 
<www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105-p0/barnett-r-rubin/saving-
afghanistan.html> (May 23 2007).  
8 Ilene R. Prusher and Philip Smucker, “Al Qaeda quietly slipping into Iran, Pakistan,” 
Christian Science Monitor, January 14 2002, <www.csmonitor.com/2002/0114/p1s2-
wosc.html> (May 23 2007). 
9 See Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-
Building after War,” Central Asian Survey 25, 1–2 (March–June 2006), p. 1–26. 




Many key intelligence, Special Forces and aviation assets were 
withdrawn from Afghanistan and sent to Iraq. Moreover, during this 
same period, many Pashtuns became disenchanted with Karzai’s Afghan 
Transitional Administration (ATA), which was widely viewed as being 
controlled by the Panshiri Tajik faction that held the government’s key 
ministries of defense, interior and foreign affairs.  
Pashtun suspicions and mistrust of the government were further 
heightened by the ATA’s inability to protect Pashtuns from the wave of 
human rights abuses perpetrated by insurgents and warlords since the fall 
of the Taliban. Finally, a considerable source of discontent and fuel for 
the insurgency involved what were widely seen as the heavy-handed 
tactics of U.S. military operations in Pashtun areas of the country. 
Despite warnings from many Afghan observers, such “hard-knock” 
operations continued to be standard procedure for several years, 
alienating much of the populace.10 Meanwhile, the Pentagon continued to 
view the Afghan situation as one of counterterrorism, not 
counterinsurgency, and conducted operations in the rural areas 
accordingly. As one U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
commander commented, “Black Ops [Special Operations 
counterterrorism forces] do more damage in my province in one night 
than I can undo in six months.”11   
There have been 579 U.S.-coalition casualties and 5,885 have been 
wounded in Afghanistan since October, 2001.12  While the overall level of 
violence in Afghanistan does not yet approach that experienced in Iraq, 
Afghanistan is actually the more dangerous place to be deployed in terms 
of fatalities per soldier-day in the combat zone. Furthermore, while the 
rate of U.S. casualties has stabilized somewhat in Iraq, it has increased 
steadily in Afghanistan since 2002.  
Some analysts believe that the Taliban have at least 12,000 fighters 
controlling areas in the provinces of Oruzgan, Helmand, Zabul and 
Kandahar.13 Extremely troubling indicators – such as the relatively free 
movement of insurgent groups – reveal that increasingly large areas of 
the east and south of the country are falling under the political control of 
                                                      
10 “Expert: Afghan War Needs New Strategy,” United Press International, May 21 2007, 
<www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Briefing/2007/05/21/expert_afghan_war_needs_new_
strategy/4851/>  (May 23 2007);  Jason Motlagh, “Afghanistan reels under bumper 
harvests,” Asia Times, July 11, 2006, 
<www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HG11Df01.html> (May 23 2007), and Paul Gallis, 
NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,” CRS Report for Congress, 
August 22, 2006 <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf> (May 23 2007). 
11 Marc Sedra, “The Forgotten War Shows No Sign of Abating,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 
April 2003. 
12 Casualty data as of May 22, 2007. See <www.icasualties.org/oef/> 
13 Center for International Issues Research, Daily Arabic Media Report, May 25 2006. 
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the Taliban. Said Jawad, Afghanistan’s ambassador to the U.S., recently 
stated,  
 
“We have lost a lot of the ground that we may have gained in 
the country, especially in the South . . . The fact that U.S. 
military resources have been ‘diverted’ to the war in Iraq is of 
course hurting Afghanistan.”14 
 
The last three years have provided ample evidence of increasingly 
sophisticated insurgent tactics being imported from Iraq and grafted onto 
classic mujahideen-style guerilla warfare. Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) and suicide operations, traditionally absent from Afghanistan, 
have become common place throughout the country. Figure 1 illustrates 
the exponential increase in suicide attacks in Afghanistan. Between 2002 
and 2005 there were only four suicide attacks. In 2005, this figure 
increased to 25 suicide bombings and in 2006, the country witnessed at 
least 139 such attacks. Taliban Mullah Hayat Khan has sworn to use 2,000 
suicide bombers to make 2007 the “bloodiest year” yet.15 
 
                 Figure 1. Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan by Year16 
                                                      
14 “Taliban, Al-Qaeda regroup in Afghanistan, defying U.S. strategy,” Online International 
News Network, <www.onlinenews.com.pk/details.php?id=97378>  (May 22 2007). 
15 Brian Glyn Williams and Cathy Young, “Cheney Attack Reveals Taliban Suicide 
Bombing Patterns,” The Jamestown Foundation, February 27 2007,  
<www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=222>  (May 30 2007). 
16 Data is based on recorded attacks compiled by Human Rights Watch, “Rising Civilian 
Casualties: Trends and Statistics,” The Human Cost: The Consequences of Insurgent 
Attacks in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch 19, 6 (April 2007), 
<www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/index.htm> (May 30 2007). 





Similar increases have been witnessed in the insurgent’s use of IEDs. In 
2006, there were at least 189 bomb attacks in which killed 492 civilians 
and injured approximately 773, a total of over 1,000 casualties.17  Overall 
2006 witnessed a 200 percent increase in insurgent attacks compared to 
2005 with September 2006 being the deadliest month in the country in 
five years. Many predict that 2007 will be more violent than 2006. 
Recent years have also recently witnessed Taliban operations 
involving larger “unit” sizes. During 2006, for example, Afghanistan 
witnessed numerous attacks consisting of over 50 insurgents, as 
compared to just a few such attacks during 2005.18  Reports of insurgents 
massing in battalion-sized formations of 300-400 fighters are no longer 
rare. It is even possible that the future may witness Taliban swarm 
attacks against smaller coalition Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). In 
early February 2007 the entire village of Musa Qala, Helmand Province 
was overrun by 200-300 Taliban. Village leaders had entered into an 
agreement with the governor of Helmand Province and with British 
forces that local police groups would keep the Taliban out if NATO 
forces would remain outside the village. The Taliban takeover resulted in 
approximately 8,000 people fleeing Musa Qala in fear of a NATO 
counterattack.19   In an interview with RFE/RL on 6 February 2007, 
Ahmed Rashid stated that:  
 
“The Taliban last year fought positional warfare – trying to 
hold ground, hold territory…The danger this year is that they 
may try to launch heavy guerrilla attacks with perhaps 200 men 
at a time, not just in three provinces but perhaps in six or seven 
provinces, even in Western Afghanistan.”20 
 
There is no question that Afghanistan’s American-backed, post-
Taliban government is struggling for its survival. President Hamid 
                                                      
17 “Rising Civilian Casualties: Trends and Statistics,” The Human Cost: The 
Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, 19, 6 (April 
2007), <www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/index.htm> (May 30 2007). 
18 Interview with Senior U.S.Government military analyst. For a similar assessment see: 
Walter Pincus, “Growing Threat Seen In Afghan Insurgency: DIA Chief Cites Surging 
Violence in Homeland,” Washington Post, March 1 2006, p. A08.  
19 For more information on the Musa Qala attack see: “NATO names ‘killed’ Taliban 
chief,” CNN,  February 5 2007,  
<www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/02/05/afghanistan.battle/>, (May 30 2007). 
20 Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Facing the Taliban Threat in the Coming Months,” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 6 2007, 
<www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=02&y=2007&id=C6C33122-BEC1-44F1-
B576-EDD1DA1FBD46>, (May 30 2007). 
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Karzai’s government is encountering extreme difficulty extending 
control and mandate outside Kabul into the country’s hinterland regions.  
The stated goal of the United States since the initiation of OEF and 
its metric of success has been to create a stable Afghan democracy which 
would never again harbor international terrorists. By that metric, we are 
losing the war in Afghanistan. Far from being the “success story” 
trumpeted by the Bush Administration, a more accurate assessment is 
that Afghanistan is once again on the edge of a collapse into anarchy and 
a safe-haven for international terrorism.  
For its part, the Karzai government seems to be popular with almost 
no one. To the Dari-speaking tribes of the north, Hamid Karzai is seen as 
a tool of the Pashto-speaking tribes of the south. To the southern 
Pashtuns, he is perceived as a weak puppet of the Americans. Today the 
Afghan government barely controls even Kabul, where suicide bombers 
now detonate themselves regularly.  
The simple, ugly fact is that the Taliban is making significant 
progress in regaining control in large areas of the country. Additionally, 
it has been asserted that a new, independent “Talibanistan” has been 
effectively created on Afghanistan's southern border inside Pakistan, 
where international terrorists linked to al-Qaeda – from Yemen, Iraq, 
Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and even Turkey – now 
train and operate freely.21 
Compounding the problem, Afghanistan has been, for at least three 
years, the worst example of a narco-state on the planet.22 Afghanistan 
now produces annually more heroin than the human race actually 
consumes in a year.23  Narcotics are responsible for at least one-half of the 
GDP in the country in one way or another and, as a result, huge amounts 
of cash are flowing into the war chests of the insurgency. The primary 
line of defense in the drug battle, the Afghan National Police, is 
disorganized, poorly trained, corrupt and one of the most hated and 
inefficient institutions in the country; the senior U.S. drug enforcement 
official in Kabul estimated in late 2005 that 90 percent of the police chiefs 
                                                      
21 “Afghanistan: The Rise of the Narco-Taliban,” Testimony of Congressman Mark Kirk 
Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Afghanistan, February 15 2007,                                 
<www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/kir021507.pdf>  (May 23 2007). 
22 Jim Maceda, “Poppies fuel Taliban’s return in Afghanistan,” MSNBC, April 27 2007, 
<www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18357411/> (May 23 2007). It should be noted, however, that 
Karzai emphatically denies this (“Karzai Says Afghanistan Is “Not a Narco State,” Voice 
of America, May 11 2007, <www.voanews.com/english/About/2007-05-11-voa52.cfm> (May 
23 2007). 
23 30 percent more, in fact (“Afghan opium cultivation soars 59 percent in 2006, UNODC 
survey shows,” UNODC, September 2 2006,  
<www.unodc.org/unodc/press_release_2006_09_01.html> (May 23 2007). 




in Afghanistan are actively involved in or protecting the narcotics 
industry.24 
The Challenges of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border and Other 
Problems 
Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan, has significant problems and challenges 
in its tribal and areas along their often ill-defined 2,560 km common 
border. As suggested above and illustrated in Figure 2, the southeastern 
tier of Afghanistan has become a hotbed of insurgents. The most 
dangerous and volatile insurgent areas in Afghanistan are those provinces 
adjacent to the Pakistan border where there has been a resurgence of 
insurgent violence during the past few years. All of these border 
provinces are designated as either “extreme risk/hostile” or “high 
risk/hostile” environments by the UN (see Figure 2).  
This area has proven vital to the Taliban who form the bulk of the 
Afghan insurgency and allegedly operate in Afghanistan from bases 
inside Pakistan. This border region also is central to forces led by Afghan 
Islamist Gulbuddin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami (HIG), the jihadi network 
of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani and foreign jihadi forces, including the 
leadership of al-Qaeda.25  These insurgent forces in the borderland 
provinces present a real and immediate challenge to the Karzai regime as 















                                                      
24 Qtd., Steve Kroft, “Afghanistan: Addicted to Heroin,” 60 Minutes, October 16 2005, 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/14/60minutes/main946648.shtml> (May 23 
2007). 
25 For an assessment of the cross-border nature of the Afghan insurgency, see:  
International Crisis Group, “Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,” 
Crisis Group Asia Report, No 123, (November 2006). 
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Figure 2. Security Situation in Afghanistan26 
 
 
                                                      
26 Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security . See: United Nations 
“Afghanistan – Maps,” Global Security.org, 2006,  
<www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/maps.htm> (November 5 2006). 




Moreover, as suggested by Figure 3, the security situation in 
Afghanistan and especially along the border area has significantly 
deteriorated in the last few years. This has been the case, as posited 
above, since spring of 2003 when many key intelligence, Special Forces 
and aviation assets were withdrawn from Afghanistan and sent to Iraq.  
 
Figure 3. Growth of High Risk Areas in Afghanistan28 
 
Besides the importance of the border area to the insurgency, the border 
area is also the epitome of a damning problem for Afghanistan – the 
significant difference between Afghan people’s expectations versus 
reality. While the Afghan population was leery of the United States for 
abandoning the country after the Soviets withdrew in early 1989, the 
majority of Afghans welcomed the U.S. action against the Taliban in 
2001.29  The Afghan population expected that the U.S. intervention would 
                                                      
28 Source: International Crisis Group, Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, 
p. 28.  
29 For a discussion of Afghan perceptions of the US post-Cold War abandonment of 
Afghanistan, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central 
Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press: 2000), p. 175-176. For a description of reactions 
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eventually lead to reconstruction of the country and a betterment of their 
individual lives.30   Most Afghans were extremely war weary from at 
least 23 years of continual and incessant warfare that destroyed 
Afghanistan as a functioning state; most of the Afghan populous desperately 
wanted peace and stability. This same population believed that the United 
States would quickly stabilize Afghanistan and better their lives. 
Tragically for Afghans as well as the regional and international 
community, these expectations have not been met for a number or 
reasons.  
The “kinetic” battle against the Taliban must be tightly and 
significantly coupled with “nonkinetic” reconstruction of Afghanistan 
and this is an area where the counterinsurgency is critically failing. 
According to a recent report assessing progress of Afghan reconstruction: 
 
• “Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an 
escalation in violence; 
 
• Public expectations are neither being met nor managed; 
 
• Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas 
targeted for development, except for the economy and 
women’s rights.”31 
 
 In the first year after the invasion by U.S. and coalition forces, the 
U.S. donated some US$350 million to reconstruction,32 or slightly more 
than ten dollars per Afghan. For a country that had just experienced 
decades of fighting resulting in the near complete destruction its 
infrastructure as well as social fabric, this amount barely began to address 
the most basic needs. By 2004, a child born in Afghanistan had less than a 
75 percent chance of living to its fifth birthday.33  And yet still much of 
the aid to Afghanistan went to projects of debatable importance to the 
average Afghan. Considerable funding went to the Kabul to Kandahar 
road, in some cases costing US$700,000 per kilometer for the slender, two 
lane highway (the U.S. built section of the road is 389 kilometers, the rest 
                                                                                                                                                           
to the US invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban, see William Maley, The 
Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 265-268. 
30 Maley, The Afghanistan Wars.  
31 Seema Patel and Steven Ross, Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan, 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2007), p. 7. 
32 “Humanitarian and Reconstruction Aid to Afghanistan: Fact Sheet,” U.S. Agency for 
International Development, September 5, 2002, 
<www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2002/fs020905.html> (May 30 2007). 
33 “Statistics,” Human Development Report 2006, (United Nations Development Programme, 
2006) <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/> (May 30 2007). 




being repaved by the Japanese government).34  Even before cost-overruns, 
the road was budgeted to cost US$270 million.35  In the end, its 
construction cost over a million dollars a mile, much of which only went 
to U.S. contractors who then subcontracted the work to Indian and 
Turkish subcontractors. Considering that the U.S. in the first four years 
after the initiation of OEF put only US$1.62 billion into development 
works,36 the cost of this one road consumed a significant portion of the 
budget.  
Further hindering international aids’ role in reconstruction is the fact 
that according to some estimates, approximately 86 percent of such aid to 
Afghanistan is ‘tied’; meaning the aid must be spent on goods or services 
from the U.S. rather than on Afghan indigenous sources. Such aid has 
little impact on Afghan economic development and has come to be 
referred to as “phantom aid”.37 
At the 2004 Berlin Donors Conference for Afghan Reconstruction, 
US$8.9 billion was pledged by over 60 countries for the period 2004-2009. 
This equals roughly US$56 per Afghan per year. If the phantom aid 
standard of the U.S. is used, only US$7.84 would reach the average 
Afghan. Thankfully, other aid donating nations have proved more 
responsible and tied less of their donations to the donor.38  Still, allowing 
for major construction projects, such as the Kabul-Kandahar road (which 
is planned to eventually ring the entire country), the U.S. and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan would do well to pressure their governments to 
make rural Afghans shareholders in their development works. Without 
local buy-in and cooperation in the construction of a new Afghanistan, 
more Afghans will slip into the shadowy worlds of insurgency and 
narcotrafficking. 
The Taliban in the border area have followed an explicit and 
systematic campaign of violence and intimidation to keep NGOs, aid and 
humanitarian workers from gaining access to beneficiaries and 
promulgating urgently needed reconstruction and humanitarian 
activities. During 2003 and 2004, thirty-six NGO workers were murdered 
                                                      
34 Ann Jones, “How U.S. dollars disappear in Afghanistan: quickly and thoroughly,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, September 3 2006, <www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/09/03/INGR0KRGMF1.DTL> (May 25 2007).  
35 “Phase I: Kabul-Kandahar Highway,” U.S. Agency for International Development, 
December 14 2003, <www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2003/fs031214.html> (May 30 2007). 
36 Margaret Coker and Anne Usher, “U.S. aid to Afghanistan falls short,” The Washington 
Times, November 19 2005, <www.washingtontimes.com/world/20051118-110234-7070r.htm> 
(May 30 2007). 
37 Jones, “How U.S. dollars disappear in Afghanistan: quickly and thoroughly”; and Real 
Aid: and Agenda for Making Aid Work, Actionaid International, 2006, 
<http://www.actionaidusa.org/actionaidrealaid.pdf> (May 30 2007). 
38 Real Aid: and Agenda for Making Aid Work.  
Thomas H. Johnson 
 
106 
by Taliban guerillas.39  In November 2003, two years after the Taliban 
retreat from Kabul, the United Nations started pulling staff from large 
areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan and closed refugee reception 
centers in four provinces.40  Unable to provide a reasonable level of 
security for their personnel, most NGO’s, including Medicines Sans 
Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), CARE, and Mercy Corps followed 
suit by leaving areas most in need. The specific targeting of NGO staff 
by the Taliban  – in addition to the general situation of insecurity – has 
created an environment in certain areas of the country (especially in the 
southern, southeastern and eastern regions) where many NGOs are 
either unable to operate, or are constrained in their operations. This 
strategy has inhibited reconstruction that could better the lives of Afghan 
citizens and, more importantly from the Taliban’s perspective, results in 
the population’s disenchantment with policy initiatives from Kabul. 
When a reconstruction or humanitarian team appears the Taliban either 
greet it with violence or intimidation until it abandons its efforts.41   The 
risk to foreign aid workers was increased when, in 2005, the Taliban 
issued a fatwa, or religious edict, ordering the death of all “infidels” and 
others supporting the foreign occupation of Afghanistan.42  This fatwa 
was an explicit part of the Taliban’s strategy to inhibit reconstruction 
efforts and increase the delta between popular expectations and reality. It 
also, ironically, allowed the Taliban to continually ask the hinterland 
community, “what has Kabul or the international community done for 
you lately?”  
Kabul and its international supporters have been hindered in 
countering this Taliban strategy primarily due to their very light security 
foot print. The absence of adequate number of troops and sufficient 
resources, they have not been able to secure the countryside to an extent 
that has allowed for reconstruction strategies to be pursued in an 
integrated and safe fashion. Table 1 presents data concerning the 
concentration of international peacekeeping forces in a variety of recent 
conflict situations. Overall, Afghanistan has the lowest international-
troop-to-population ratio (and one of the lowest international-aid to-
                                                      
39 Afghanistan NGO Safety Office and CARE, NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan, May 2005, p 
3-4, <www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/20050505_ansocare.pdf>,  (May 
23 2007).  
40 “U.N. Refugee Agency Begins Afghan Withdrawal,” The Associated Press, November 18 
2003. 
41 See Afghanistan NGO Safety Office and CARE, NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan; 
“Taliban Threatens to Kill Afghan Women in Foreign NGOs,” Asian Political News, 
October 28 2003; and Medicins Sans Frontiers Article, “Military Humanitarianism: A 
Deadly Confusion,” December 16 2004. 
42 Amnesty International, Afghanistan, All Who Are Not Friends Are Enemies: Taleban 
Abuses Against Civilians, April 2007,  
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa110012007> (May 23 2007). 




population ratios) of any major intervention in the past decade.43  In the 
Kosovo and Bosnia interventions, the peacekeeper-to-citizen ratios were 
1:50 and 1:66, respectively. For the first four years of the Bonn process, the 
comparable figure for Afghanistan hovered near 1:2000. In fact, 
historically, the force commitment to Afghanistan represents the lowest 
level of effort in any international intervention since World War II. 
Today as seen in Table 1, the ratio of NATO and U.S. troops to Afghan 
population is roughly 1:653, or about 1/10th of the force level required to 
actually bring about stability when there is no active resistance or 
insurgency.44   
 
Table 1: Comparison of Peak International Troop Strength by Territory and Population45 
 









Kosovo 40,000 1 per 0.3 km 1 per 50 
Bosnia 60,000 1 per 0.85 km 1 per 66 
East Timor 9,000 1 per 1.6 km 1 per 111 
Iraq 155,000 1 per 2.8 km 1 per 161 
Somalia 40,000 1 per 16.0 km 1 per 200 
Liberia 11,000; 2200 (MEF) 1 per 8.0 km 1 per 265 
Sierra Leone 18,000 1 per 4.0 km 1 per 300 
Haiti 20,000 1 per 1.5 km 1 per 375 
AFGHANISTAN 49,000 1 per 13.21 km 1 per 653 
 
In summary, the international force commitment to Afghanistan is 
absurdly small for its stated mission. Using case studies of more than 50 
insurgencies since WWII, counterinsurgency experts apply a rough rule 
of thumb of one security provider (i.e., a soldier, reliable policeman, 
                                                      
43 Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan & Philip Wilkinson, “Minimal Investments, Minimal 
Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” AERU Briefing Paper, June 2004, 
p. 9. 
44 “Bush, NATO Chief regret Afghan deaths,” Agence France-Press, May 22 2007,  
<www.afp.com/english/news/stories/070522033722.nl6zi1hp.html> (May 23 2007). 
45 Sources: Rubin, B.R., Stoddard, A., Hamidzada, H., Farhadi, A., Building a New 
Afghanistan: The Value of Success, the Cost of Failure, (Center on International 
Cooperation, March 2004):15; CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov); Dobbins, J., McGinn, 
J., Crane, K., Jones, S., Lal, R., Rathmell, A., Swanger, R., Timilsina, A., America's Role 
in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2003), and; Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan & Philip Wilkinson, “Minimal 
Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” AERU 
Briefing Paper, June 2004, p. 11. 
46 Kalev  I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”, Military Review, (May-June 
2005), p. 8–12; also see:  David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, (Rand Corporation, 
2006); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, (London: Praeger, 1964); Robert Taber, 
War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 
2002), and; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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temporary armed auxiliary, etc., under the effective command and 
control of the central government) for every six citizens to shut down an 
insurgency.46   Counting the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Border 
Police, the paramilitary militias and other armed squads not even 
remotely under government control, the figure for Afghanistan today is 
not 1:6 but closer to 1:200. This type of security commitment can not 
pacify the countryside and allow for meaningful reconstruction to take 
place.  
Haji Fezal, an Afghan farmer and transport business owner from 
Khakar, Zabul Province sums up the problem, when he states, “In our 
hearts we don’t support the Taliban, but people have no choice because 
the government can’t provide them with security … [the Taliban are] 
pouring across the border from Pakistan, and the government can’t 
control what is happening in the districts.”47  Border area villages such as 
Khakar can be considered “swing areas.”  That is to suggest, as Haji Fezal 
implies, that people living in this border area would probably side with 
Kabul if the Afghan regime and their international supporters offered the 
villagers sustained security and hope for a better life. But these desires 
have not been fulfilled and in their absence much of the population has 
turned its allegiance to the Taliban insurgents or has remained neutral. 
Khakar is illustrative of most of the Afghan villages south of the 
Helmand River where the Taliban’s power and influence is greatest and 
security is paltry. For example, Khakar has: 
 
• No aid or humanitarian workers assisting to better the lives of 
its poor and illiterate population (According to the United 
Nations 80 percent of Zabul’s 300,000 residents are ill fed 
subsistence farmers and herders); 
 
• Only two midwives, but no obstetricians or trained doctors or 
any medical facilities, and;  
 
• Less than 10 percent of girls attending school and only 5 percent 
of woman are literate (in 2005 Afghan legislative elections, 11 
percent of Zabul women voted, compared with the national 
average of 40 percent).48 
 
The small number of NATO Forces in the border area provinces 
compounds the problems because it does not allow for meaningful 
                                                      
47 Denis Gray, “A backwater Afghan village straddles the fence between government and  
the Taliban,” The Associated Press, April 30 2007 , 
<www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/29/asia/AS-GEN-Afghan-Razors-Edge.php> (May 31 
2007). 
48 Ibid. 




reconstruction or humanitarian aid. NATO has only 1,000 troops and the 
Afghan National Army has only 600 troops in the entire province of 
Zabul; meaning that there is approximately one troop for every 11.3 
square kilometers in Zabul. While this troop concentration is greater 
than the average across the entire country (see Table 1) it is still meager 
considering the amount of insurgent activity in this critical border 
province. 
The Pakistani-side of the Border   
Many claim that attempting to analyze the Afghan-side of the border 
without recognizing the importance of the Pakistani-side of the border is 
a fruitless exercise. Afghan officials in the past two years have made 
progressively stronger comments linking Islamabad to the Taliban 
insurgency by claiming that Pakistan provides a  reliable, safe, and fertile 
recruiting, training, and fund-raising haven just across the border. 
President Hamid Karzai has directly accused Pakistan's government of 
supporting the Taliban: “The problem is not Taliban. We don't see it that 
way. The problem is with Pakistan … The state of Pakistan [is] 
supporting the Taliban, so we presume if there is still any Taliban, that 
they are being supported by a state element.”49  The Pakistani regime 
vehemently denies such allegations and argues that they are making 
incredible sacrifices supporting the U.S. War on Terrorism.  
The Pakistani-side of this border area contains the country’s two 
western provinces of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier (NWFP), 
as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). These areas 
have some of the highest rates of poverty, illiteracy, and violence in 
Pakistan but they receive little development assistance from Islamabad. 
The NWFP, for example, received just US$34 million in federal aid and 
development grants in 2006, compared with Punjab's US$210 million – 
even though Punjab, by many accounts, already has the healthiest 
economic indicators in Pakistan.50  Some American intelligence officials 
place Mullah Omar within 20 miles of Quetta, the capital of 
Baluchistan,51 although the Pakistani senior authorities vigorously deny 
                                                      
49 Alisa Tang, “Pakistan accused of supporting Taliban,” Associated Press, December 12 
2006, <www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2006/december/dec132006.html> 
(December 14 2006). 
50 David Montero, “Pakistan losing territory to radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
May 29, 2007, <www.csmonitor.com/2007/0529/p01s04-wosc.html> (May 30 2007). 
51 Peter Bergen, Anderson Cooper, and Charlie Moore, “Source: Mullah Omar in 
Pakistan,” CNN, September 9 2006.  
<www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/09/09/pakistan.mullahomar/index.html>(Nove
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this.52  But what few deny is the apparent fact that economic and political 
failure in these provinces, as well as in the FATA, is fanning extremism.  
The FATA in particular has become an extremely prominent area for 
the Afghan insurgency. The FATA is located along Pakistan’s north 
western border with Afghanistan, and consists of seven semi-
autonomous agencies or administrative districts – Bajaur, Khyber, 
Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, South Waziristan and North Waziristan 
(see Figure 4).53   
The name for this area is actually a misnomer. These lands are not 
Federally Administered in any sense of the word.54  As experienced by the 
British as well as the Pakistanis, this is an area that has never been under 
the explicit control of anyone but the Pashtun tribes that dominate the 
area.55  Indeed, Islamabad for all practical purposes has never controlled 
any more than ten yards to the left and right of the major roads of the 
tribal areas. Just as Kabul has little control on their side of the border, 





     
                                                      
52 “Mullah Omar not present in Quetta: Kasuri,” Pak Tribune, September 18 2006. 
<http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?154478> (November 11 2006) as well as 
the author’s numerous interviews with senior Pakistani government officials, March 2007.  
53 For an excellent analysis of the FATA and border area: International Crisis Group, 
“Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing The Militants,” Asia Report No. 124, December 11, 
2006. 
54 As pointed out by Rahimullah Yusufzai, in his analysis for BBC, “…Pakistani courts 
and police have no jurisdiction in the tribal areas.”  See Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Analysis: 
Pakistan’s tribal frontiers,” BBC News, December 14 2001, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1711316.stm>, (May 23 2007). For an overview of 
the political administration and control of the FATA please refer to the website 
maintained by the Pakistan government see <http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?link=3>, 
(May 23 2007). 
55 The obstinacy of the Pashtun tribes combined with the inability of the British to control 
them contributed to the policy of “masterly inactivity” toward Afghanistan and a very 
loose system of political activity in the area that now comprises the FATA in Pakistan. 
See Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: 
Kodansha America, Inc., 1992), p. 285-286; and Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History 
of Its People and Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 76. 








The mainly Pashtun tribes that inhabit the areas are fiercely 
independent but, until friction resulted following the fall of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan (many of which originally came from refugee camps or 
madrassas – religious schools – in the FATA), the tribes had primarily 
                                                      
56 Source: “Welcome to FATA,” Federally Administered Tribal Area Official 
Government Website, <www.fata.gov.pk/> (June 4 2007).  
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friendly relations with Pakistan's central government. These tribes are 
still governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation introduced under the 
British Raj.57   The head of each tribal agency is the political agent. 
Historically the political agent wields extensive powers but lately many 
of these powers have been reduced. Each Agency has roughly two to 
three thousand khasadars (tribal security officers) and five to nine wings 
of the Frontier Corp58 to ensure maintenance of law and order in the 
agency as well as border security.  
The FATA’s lawlessness and lack of explicit federal control has made 
it a perfect ungoverned space to be exploited by both al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban. Likewise, Pakistan’s failure to extend its control over and 
provide good governance in the FATA is equally responsible for 
empowering the radicals. In addition, the FATA is undoubtedly one of 
Pakistan’s poorest regions. With high poverty and unemployment rates 
and a badly under-developed infrastructure, its economy is dependent on 
smuggling as well as narcotics and weapons trafficking.  
The Pashtuns, whose traditional homeland runs on either side of the 
Afghan-Pakistan border and prominently includes the FATA, have 
always been leery of any government control, be it from Pakistan or 
Afghanistan. Moreover, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Afghans 
fled to refugee camps many of which are located in border area (see 
Figure 5). During the 1980s, millions of Pashtun Afghans fled to Pakistan 
to escape the atrocities of the Soviet military campaigns. Most of these 
refugees settled in the camps that had sprung up in the border area 
provinces. These camps which represent over 40 percent of the estimated 
Afghan population in Pakistan59 and the thousands of madrassas located 
in the FATA have offered the Taliban an almost infinite supply of 
recruits. Many poorly educated, unemployed Afghan youth who have 
grown up in the border region’s refugee camps have gravitated to the 
militant madrassas. Hundreds of these madrassas basically function as 






                                                      
57 Ibid., p. 3. 
58 Both the Khasadars and Frontier Corps consist of Agency tribal members. A Wing of 
the Frontier Corp is roughly equivalent to an infantry battalion. 
59 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Afghans in Peshawar: Migration, 
Settlement and Social Networks, January 2006, p. 13. 




    
   Figure 5: Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan: Top 35 Camps by Province60 
                                                      
60 Pakistan Population Census and UNHCR GIS Unit, Islamabad.  
62 Received by author from Senior Pakistani Military Officer, Islamabad, March 2006. 




Figure 6 suggests an additional dilemma of this border. That is, there 
are numerous villages in FATA and Baluchistan that straddle the 
Afghan-Pakistan border. Figure 7 presents an overhead photo of one such 
village – Barabchah, Baluchistan – that is literally cut in two by the 
border. While the Afghan-Pakistan border has always been artificial to 
Pashtuns who regularly transverse it, divided villages offer a relatively 
easy venue for crossing illegally into or out of Afghanistan or Pakistan. 
Attempting to control such a porous border is difficult enough; with 
divided villages such as Barabchah any attempts at border control become 
nearly impossible. The Taliban recognize this and regularly exploit such 
areas to enter and exit Afghanistan in support of their insurgent activities 
and there is little any state can do to control this. 
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Figure 7. Village of Barabchah: Divided by Afghanistan-Pakistan Border63 
 
 
Further compounding the dilemma of the border is that on the 
average day 31,000 people, Afghans as well as Pakistanis cross the border 
at one of the two legal crossing points.64 Additionally, there are thousands  
who cross illegally at a plethora of other remote border crossing points. 
The often ill-defined 2,560 km border between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
does not even constitute a speed bump to groups such as the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda seeking to increase their influence among the Pashtun. To some 
in the U.S. this has led to a belief that Pakistan is actively supporting or 
at least complacent regarding Afghan insurgents. As Henry A. 
Crumpton, the U.S. Department of State coordinator for counter-
terrorism, asserts: 
 
“The Americans are finding the Pakistanis much more 
reluctant to face down the Taliban—who are brethren from the 
Pashtun ethnic group that dominates in Afghanistan—than 
                                                      
63 Received by author from Senior Pakistani Military Officer, Islamabad, March 2006; 
DigitalGlobe data. 
64 The reference is to the border crossing at Chaman, Baluchistan and the data is based on 
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they have been to confront al-Qaeda, who are largely outsiders. 
Has Pakistan done enough?  I think the answer is no. . . . Not 
only Al Qaeda, but Taliban leadership are primarily in 
Pakistan, and the Pakistanis know that.”65 
 
The problem is more complicated than this. There is little argument 
that the dynamics of the FATA are closely tied to continuing problems in 
Afghanistan, especially the Taliban insurgency. As witnessed by recent 
combat clashes in the tribal agency of South Waziristan, this area is 
possibly Pakistan’s most troubling. Clashes between native Pashtun 
tribal elements and foreign militants, primarily disenchanted groups such 
as Uzbeks and other Islamists, indicate this area is being used for 
guerrilla training and as an operating base.66   Many of these groups (but 
not all) are explicitly aligned with their “Talibanized” Pashtun allies.  
In 2004, after negotiating with tribal spokesmen, Pakistan responded 
to rising FATA Islamic militancy with an unprecedented deployment of 
a reported 80,000 troops to the border area and started military campaigns 
against Islamist rebels; “miscreants” in the official language of 
Islamabad. The major goal of these operations was to forcibly integrate 
the FATA into Pakistan-proper. Pakistani military actions in the FATA 
have been conducted primarily by the 11th Corp of the Pakistani Army 
with the support of the Frontier Corp. These actions have resulted in the 
deaths of some 700 Pakistani troops.67    
According to the International Crisis Group, the military operations 
in South and North Waziristan Agencies,  
 
“…to deny al-Qaeda and the Taliban safe haven and curb cross-
border militancy have failed, largely due to an approach 
alternating between excessive force and appeasement. When 
force has resulted in major military losses, the government has 
amnestied pro-Taliban militants in return for verbal 
commitments to end attacks on Pakistani security forces and 
empty pledges to cease cross-border militancy and curb foreign 
terrorists.”68  
 
                                                      
65 Eric Schmitt, ‘‘Springtime for Killing in Afghanistan,’’ New York Times, May 28 2006. 
66 “Afghanistan: The Rise of the Narco-Taliban,” Testimony of Congressman Mark Kirk 
Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Afghanistan, February 15 2007, 
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67 M Ilyas Khan, “Taleban spread wings in Pakistan,” BBC News, March 5 2007, 
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Pakistani Military Officials, March 2007, Islamabad, Peshawar, and Quetta Pakistan). 
68 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” p. i. 




Recently Islamabad signed the Miranshah ‘‘peace agreement’’ in North 
Waziristan, seemingly in an attempt to control militants and their ‘‘guest 
fighters,’’ who have been operating against NATO forces in Afghanistan 
as well as Pakistani forces in the FATA. Similar agreements in 2004 and 
2005 did virtually nothing to stop cross-border movements of the Taliban 
and other insurgents. The simple fact is that Pakistan has limited or no 
control in this area. This most recent ‘‘peace agreement’’ represents 
either: one, a formal Pakistani surrender to the Waziris, or two, a tactic 
in a larger strategic campaign to reconstruct the tribal social structure in 
an attempt to deter the influence of jihadis as well as the Taliban in the 
border area. 
One of the very significant consequences of the Afghan’s anti-Soviet 
Jihad of the late 1970s and 1980s relative to the Pakistan border area was 
the destruction of the Pashtun temporal maliks69 and khans and their 
replacement by Islamist mullahs as FATA power-brokers. This became 
even more important when Pakistan helped push the Taliban into 
Afghanistan in the 1990s.70  That is, Pakistan purposefully deconstructed 
the traditional tribal order in the FATA in an effort to promote radical 
Islamist mullahs who could recruit for the Afghan mujahideen in their 
conflict against the Soviet occupiers.71  In retrospect this policy of social 
reconstruction in the tribal areas helped fuel not only the eventual Soviet 
defeat in Afghanistan (Pakistan’s as well as the U.S. original strategic 
objective) but also the promotion and “blowback” from radical mullahs. 
While this social experiment resulted in the recruitment of many FATA 
Pashtuns to fight with their Afghan cousins and brothers against the 
Soviet invader/occupier, it also led to the permanent radicalization of the 
FATA tribal area and the opening of the FATA area to jihadist and other 
radicals such as bin Laden. Many in Pakistan felt that they could 
eventually recreate the traditional malik/khan dominated social system 
once the Soviets were defeated and driven out of Afghanistan. The 
momentum of radicalization and the very significant presence of foreign 
jihadis in the FATA, however, suggest that the odds of the radical 
fundamentalist genie returning to the bottle are unlikely indeed. 
Continued radicalization and the failure to prohibit access and refuge for 
the Taliban as well as foreign jihadis in the FATA has greatly hindered 
                                                      
69 The British first introduced the maliki system which Pakistan retained. This system 
was aimed at creating reliable local elite whose loyalty could be rewarded by the state 
through special status, financial benefits, and official recognition of influence over the 
tribes. 
70 Ahmed Rashid delves into the evolution of Pakistan support for radical Islamists and 
the Taliban as part of a comprehensive Afghan Strategy. See Rashid, Taliban: Militant 
Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia, p. 84 and pp. 186-187. 
71 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005): p. 67. 
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stabilization in Afghanistan, and has prompted Washington’s criticisms 
of Pakistan’s border policies. 
An alternative view of the Pakistan’s Miranshah ‘‘peace agreement” 
is that Islamabad has basically been attempting to buy time with the 
FATA Pashtuns. According to this view, the peace agreement is only 
understood as a part of a more important, long-term strategy to buy off 
tribal leaders and others in an attempt to reconstruct the old malik/khan 
social structure of the FATA. Eventually, according to its Pakistani 
proponents, this strategy is to result in the FATA’s integration into the 
NWFP.72  A primary driver of this strategy is its objective to separate the 
Taliban from the foreign jihadis. Inter-militant fighting in Waziristan is, 
in part, indicative of fissures based on, and demonstrative of ideological 
rifts between the Taliban and the jihadis and reflective of comments made 
recently by Mullah Omar, who has claimed that the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
operated separately.73  The differences in opinion are due to differing 
points of focus for the Taliban and al-Qaeda: the Taliban remain focused 
on Afghanistan, while al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain committed to 
fighting the U.S. and its global allies, including Pakistani President 
Musharraf and the Pakistani presence in the FATA. These internal 
differences are indicative of the continued willingness of tribal leaders to 
sign peace agreements with the Pakistani government and point to why, 
despite the signing of such deals, militant attacks against Pakistani 
government officials have continued.  
By now, it is obvious the security dilemmas of Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and U.S./NATO Forces rest in the land of the Pashtuns. Any further 
analysis of the efforts there must be made with a firm understanding of 
the Pashtun human terrain.  
The Pashtun Population of Pakistan and Afghanistan 
 
The Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war. 
- Pashtun Proverb 
-  
You want to know whether I am first a Pashtun, a Muslim, or a Pakistani. I have been a 
Pashtun for 2,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years, and a Pakistani for 30 years. Therefore, I will 
always be a Pashtun first. 
- Wali Khan 
 
The Afghan provinces that are significantly threatened by the 
Taliban or witnessing intensified Taliban activity are predominantly 
                                                      
72 Author’s interview with senior Pakistani Military and Government Officials, March 
2007, Islamabad and Peshawar, Pakistan. 
73 Hassan Abbas, “South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir: The New Face of the Taliban,” 
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Pashtun (see Figure 2).74 Pashtuns, of course, are also the primary players 
in the present insurgency rocking Afghanistan. Many policy makers as 
well as analysts, however, view the Taliban as nothing more than a 
highly radicalized Islamists, and view all Taliban as terrorists. This view 
misses the shared Pashtun tribal ethnicity of the insurgency and the 
family and clan ties that are stronger than any ties to the central 
government. To understand the Taliban one must understand their 
Pashtun ethos. 
In addition to the Taliban, the two other major insurgent groups 
challenging the Karzai regime and his international supporters – the HiG 
and the jihadi network of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani – are also Pashtun 
movements. Quite simply, to understand the Afghan insurgency one 
needs to understand the Pashtun.75 As seen in Figure 8(a/b), the home of 
the Pashtuns is found in the region of southeast Afghanistan and 
northwest Pakistan. This region has been a crossroads for countless 
conquerors and is an environment of stark contrasts with snow capped 
peaks, fertile river valleys, and barren plains and as suggested by Sir Olaf 
Caroe – a place where the land fashions the people, rather than the people 
fashioning the land.76   
Pashtuns represent one of the largest ethnic groups in the world with 
an estimated 25 million members.77  With a significant number of people 
living in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, the ethnic group wields a great 
deal of influence in both countries. Yet Pashtuns are not homogeneous. 
As an ethnic group, Pashtuns are divided into several different tribes, 
which represent larger groupings such as the Ghilzais or Durranis in 
Afghanistan and the Wazirs or Mahsuds in Pakistan.78  All members 
share a common language (Pashto), a common culture (largely based on 
Pashtunwali), and can trace their lineage back to the tribe’s original 
founding father. Each tribe is made up of different clans, which are also 
based on paternal lineage.79 
 
                                                      
74 Pashtuns refer to a tribal society, Pashto or Pushto refer to their indigenous language, 
and Pashtunwali refers to their cultural/tribal code. Pashtuns are believed to be the 
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77 Tribal population estimate from the CIA World Factbook,  
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            Figure 8a:  Maps of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan80 
 
          Figure 8b:  Maps of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan81 
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As a people, Pashtuns identify themselves in terms of familial ties 
and commitments. Social, political, and economic activities exist within 
this sphere and prevent government oriented institutions from gaining a 
foothold in tribal areas.86  Despite the fact that the Pashtun’s homeland is 
an easy area to invade, no foreign entity has been able to truly conquer 
it.87  During the period of the Great Game, Great Britain struggled and 
failed to subject the Pashtuns to state authority.88  The Soviets, during 
their time of invasion and occupation, were never able to subjugate the 
Pashtun homelands despite the commitment of extensive military 
personnel and materiel.89   Even today on the Pakistani side of the border 
– the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas – are predominantly 
inhabited by Pashtuns who are exempt from Pakistani law. This fact also 
illustrates the importance of the FATA to the Taliban insurgency as a 
place of refuge, training and cross-border incursions into Afghanistan.  
To understand the Pashtuns, and in many respects the Taliban, it is 
important to understand their tribal code known as Pashtunwali, which 
translates as “the way of the Pashtuns.” The Pashtuns live in a tribal 
culture and the Taliban are intimately aware of this fact and play on its 
implications. For example, the Taliban will regularly appeal to people’s 
sense of “Pashtunism” in their narratives.90   
First and foremost, Pashtunwali is about honor (nang). The Pashtun’s 
concept of honor is not derived from a western society’s modern 
definition of honor based on morality or justice. Rather, the Pashtun’s 
sense of honor is founded on his close, unquestionable observance of 
Pashtunwali. In the past, this difference has created a great deal of 
tension between Pashtuns and those states attempting to establish their 
own rule of law. The concept of justice is wrapped up in a Pashtun’s 
maintenance of his honor. Action which must be taken to preserve honor, 
but contradicts or breaks the laws of a state would seem perfectly 
acceptable to a Pashtun. In fact, his honor would demand it.91  
“[Pashtunwali is] an uncompromising social code so profoundly at odds 
with Western mores that its application constantly brings one up with a 
jolt.”92  A Pashtun must adhere the code to maintain his honor to retain 
his identity as a Pashtun. Pashtunwali defines both action and reaction to 
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most circumstances of social interaction. Below, we will see this code’s 
implications for operations resulting in the deaths of civilians in the 
Afghan insurgency and counterinsurgency.  
Pashtunwali encompasses a code of conduct, dealing with everything 
from such noble ideas as democracy and alms-giving. But what concerns 
us here and U.S./NATO forces in the field, is the concept of badal or 
“revenge.”  Life is seen as a sacred gift, and once taken, inadvertently or 
otherwise, the taker must be prepared for the consequences. The kith and 
kin of the deceased will remain mortal enemies until the issue is resolved, 
and therefore “collateral damage” must be avoided at all costs. 
Pashtuns represent a “hard case” for any government seeking to 
establish its central authority over their tribal areas – be it Kabul or 
Islamabad. Historically, rural Pashtuns have avoided being subjugated or 
integrated by a larger nation. As one elderly Pashtun tribesman once 
stated to Mountstuart Elphinstone, a British official in Afghanistan in 
1809, “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are 
content with blood…we will never be content with a master.”93  Many of 
these characteristics make Pashtuns the perfect insurgents, a fact not lost 
upon the Taliban. 
Respect for their well-established, long standing tribal code binds the 
numerous Pashtun tribes, especially the rural tribes, and constitutes them 
as a distinctive ethnic group. Several states have attempted to intervene 
in Pashtun society and supersede Pashtunwali with a more progressive 
central rule of law, yet Pashtunwali continues as the rule of law for tribes 
living in rural areas.  
While it would be incorrect to refer to the Taliban insurrection or 
resurrection as merely a Pashtun affair, it would not be far from the 
mark. Pashtun areas of Afghanistan have received the least amount of 
development assistance, and projects undertaken by the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are just as easily destroyed by the Taliban 
once coalition forces leave the area. The head of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), Gen. Maples, has stated that due to the Taliban’s 
increased strength within their core Pashtun community, 2007 will 
witness heretofore unseen levels of violence and possibly twice the 
casualties of 2006.94 
The journalist Ahmed Rashid recently claimed that in addition to the 
noticeable decrease in Pashtun power in Afghanistan since the removal 
of the Taliban (despite the fact that President Karzai himself is a Pashtun 
of the Durrani tribe), the Taliban has been working hard to coalesce 
Pashtun public opinion and support behind them. Together with the 
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perception that Americans see all Pashtun as the enemy, the Taliban and 
their Pakistani sympathizers within the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
have striven to unite the Pashtun conceptions of the mosque (masjid) and 
the throne (hujra), under the divine leadership of the Taliban and Mullah 
Omar.95 
Death of Afghan Innocents 
While the death of non-combatant civilians (often referred to as 
collateral damage) has unfortunately accompanied all wars, the death of 
Afghan innocents has become an extremely significant aspect of the 
Afghan insurgency and counterinsurgency.  
The Taliban regularly threaten and kill Afghan civilians in the 
pursuit of their insurgent goals.96  The Taliban often justify such acts 
through narratives that claim that their battle with the Karzai “puppet” 
regime and its foreign coalition represents a “cosmic conflict” between 
the righteous and the infidel. Afghans, in the eyes of the Taliban, have a 
collective religious responsibility to fight the “apostates and invaders”. 
Those Afghans assisting or cooperating with the Kabul regime or the 
United States and its international coalition are legitimate targets 
because the Afghan population has a “religious duty” to oppose “infidels 
and foreign crusaders.”97  The death of Afghan non-combatants by the 
United States and their coalition does not have such a pat response.  
Operations resulting in the death of Afghan civilians have become 
extremely problematic for the counterinsurgency and have sparked angry 
protests against foreign troops and calls for President Hamid Karzai's 
resignation. It is increasingly argued that mounting civilian casualties 
from U.S. and NATO air strikes against the Taliban are undermining 
Kabul’s mission, and in turn helping the insurgents recruit more 
fighters.98  The issue of civilian deaths is a delicate one for Karzai's U.S. - 
backed government and takes on even broader implications when 
combined with the Afghan complaint of the lack of development despite 
billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan.  
Particularly problematic has been the careless use of U.S. air power, 
which has killed scores of civilians, and the apparent lack of sensitivity 
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by U.S. troops to local perceptions, laws and customs. According to 
reports in the Afghan press, “U.S. Special Forces, during routine sweeps 
of Afghan villages searching for weapons and members of resistance 
groups, have physically abused villagers, damaged personal property, and 
subjected women to body searches, a major affront on a family’s honor.”99  
UN officials have commented that “This doesn’t help us at all . . . the 
people are basically pro-America. They want U.S. forces to be here. But 
American soldiers are not very culturally sensitive. It’s hardly surprising 
that Afghans get angry when the Americans turn up and kick their doors 
in.”100  
There have been multiple episodes of U.S. and NATO 
counterinsurgency actions that have resulted in the death and injury of 
Afghan innocents. The implications of this are profound. As suggested 
by the International Crisis Group (ICG) “when a child is killed in one of 
these villages, that village is lost for 100 years. These places run on 
revenge.” 101   
Afghans, and especially Pashtuns, have historically been fiercely 
independent and highly xenophobic. Operating in such an environment 
is extremely challenging for foreign forces as witnessed by Alexander the 
Great,102 the British,103  the Soviets104 and now the United States and 
NATO.105  It is especially difficult when such operations involve the loss 
of civilians and can be explicitly used by the Taliban to seemingly 
validate their narratives that the conflict in Afghanistan is “a cosmic 
conflict between the righteous’ and the infidel who want to kill innocent 
Muslims.”  The Pashtun population, in turn, finds itself increasingly 
siding with the Taliban both on the Afghan and Pakistani sides of the 
Durand line or at least clinging to neutral positions.  
During a 24-hour period in early March of this year, for example, two 
such events took place that crystallized the damning implications of 
“collateral damage” in Pashtun Afghanistan. On March 4th a U.S. Marine 
Special Operations Command convoy traveling on a roadway connecting 
the eastern city of Jalalabad to the Pakistani border, in the district of 
Mohmand Daraas was attacked by a VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised 
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explosive device) and subsequently starting shooting at passer-bys as the 
convoy sped from the scene according to Afghan witnesses.106  U.S. 
Army sources later reported that ten civilians were killed and 35 more 
injured by the Marines. This event was broadly criticized by both Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai and the international media and eventually led 
to the removal of the entire unit (about 120 Marines)107 from Afghanistan 
by Army Maj. Gen. Francis H. Kearney III, head of Special Operations 
Command Central. He also initiated an investigation into the March 4 
incident.108  The incident also resulted in street protests by thousands of 
Afghans in Jalalabad calling for the demise of the Kabul Government as 
well as the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops. 
Less than 24 hours after the Jalalabad incident, eight civilians were 
reported killed and 35 injured in Kapisa during a coalition air strike and 
artillery attack. Afghan President Karzai was quick to criticize these 
events and declared that his government can no longer tolerate the deaths 
of innocent Afghans.  
Recently President Bush and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer have stated they would attempt to “reduce civilian deaths” in 
Afghanistan. While lamenting the civilian deaths, Scheffer as well as 
Bush blamed the losses on Taliban tactics such as using “civilians as 
human shields”.109  As suggested elsewhere,  
 
“[T]he Taliban purposely retreat to village areas after an 
operation hoping that the coalition will attack. At the strategic 
level, the Taliban is fighting a classic  ‘war of the flea,’ largely 
along the same lines used by the mujahideen twenty years ago 
against the Soviets, including fighting in villages to deliberately 
provoke air strikes and collateral damage. They gladly trade the 
lives of a few dozen guerrilla fighters in order to cost the 
American forces the permanent loyalty of that village, under 
the code of Pashtun social behavior called Pashtunwali and its 
obligation for revenge (Badal), which the U.S. Army does not 
even begin to understand.”110  
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Even recognizing the insidious nature of such Taliban actions, such as 
retiring to a village and attempting to bait a coalition response, the lack of 
an explicit apology to the Afghan people concerning the deaths of 
innocent civilians is counterproductive. In the prosecution of a 
counterinsurgency, where the opinions and support of the local, 
indigenous population are critical for operational success, an official 
apology for civilian deaths is a small price to pay for hearts and minds. 
While many U.S. officers recognize this fact, other high ranking U.S. 
officers seem to lament its recognition. Consider for example the 
experience of U.S. Army Col. John Nicholson, the brigade commander of 
U.S. Forces in the eastern sector of Afghanistan. Nicholson recently 
apologized to the families of the Afghan civilians killed and injured by 
Marines during the March 4, 2007 event near Jalalabad discussed above. 
Nicholson apologized because,  
 
“keeping civilians on the side of the U.S.-led coalition was 
essential in combating the counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan.”111  Gen. James T. Conway, commandant of the 
Marine Corps, subsequently criticized Nicholson for his 
apology “because investigators have yet to determine whether 
any wrongdoing occurred.”112   
 
While Conway may be correct in a legalistic sense, his criticism fails to 
recognize that every civilian death counts against the Americans and 
greatly hinders the counterinsurgency. The ultimate implications of 
“collateral damage” to the Pashtun tribal ethos – that puts a high 
premium on personal and family honor and in codes of revenge that 
demand revenge – are immense:  
 
“The shopkeepers glower as an American military patrol 
rumbles past the village bazaar at Afghany, some 80 miles 
northeast of Kabul. Mohammad Qayam and Ghul Jan are still 
seething about the precision U.S. airstrike in early March that 
hit their friend Mirwais's home, less than a mile away. They 
and other neighbors pulled nine broken corpses from the ruins: 
Mirwais's grandfather, father, mother, wife and five small 
children. Mirwais himself and his 7-year-old son were away 
seeing relatives, the men say; now he has fled into the 
mountains. Although local officials accuse Mirwais of 
belonging to the Taliban, his neighbors say he was only a 
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farmer. “We hate the Americans so much now, we don't want 
to see their faces,” says Jan. ‘They're no different from the 
Russians.’”113 
 
The United States and its NATO allies must come to grips with the 
implications of the death of Afghan civilians and pursue operations that 
avoid the harm to civilians. Mohammad Farid Hamidi, a member of the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, cogently suggests 
the ultimate implications of civilian deaths when he quotes an Afghan 
proverb: “A hundred good works can be destroyed by one mistake.”114 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Afghanistan faces significant hurdles as it seeks to overcome the Taliban 
insurgency in the Pashtun areas. Not only must it prevent the insurgency 
from spreading into other parts of Afghanistan, but it must deal with the 
Taliban in the Taliban’s home turf, in the Pashtun tribal areas of the 
Southeast and in the hearts and minds of the Pashtun tribesmen. 
Pashtuns, and Pashtunwali, are complicated dynamics that defy any 
simple explanation. Culture, development indicators, and history all play 
a huge role in the conflict, and one that cannot be solved solely by combat 
operations. The culture of the Pashtuns must be accommodated and 
taken into consideration before the outset of any action. Canine units in 
homes, soldiers dressed in full body armor, and especially “collateral 
damage” are things Pashtuns take very seriously. As their support is 
necessary for a stable Afghanistan, their concerns must be addressed. 
Developmentally, the role of U.S./NATO forces must be proactive. 
Much of the tribal hinterlands that have proved so fertile for the 
recruitment efforts of the Taliban have seen little or no development 
works from either foreign forces or the government in Kabul. When the 
tribes living in these regions can see a benefit for themselves from a 
stable and democratic Afghanistan, the Taliban will see its sea drained. 
Historically, Afghanistan, and especially the tribal belt, has proven 
impossible to pacify by foreign armies. Since the first Anglo-Afghan 
War onward, it has been Pashtun tribesmen who have brought 
destruction to imperial armies. As has oft been stated, however, this war 
is different. The goal is not territory or domination or colonial interests, 
but the hearts, minds, and freedom of the Afghan people. With a new 
government in Kabul, led by a Pashtun president, Afghanistan has a 
fresh start, and one that is theirs and ours to lose. Both military and non-
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military resources must be increased if a free and stable Afghanistan free 
of terrorists is to be realized. 
From a military viewpoint, a more determined effort must be made to 
avoid civilian casualties. Increasingly air power has been relied upon to 
dislodge Taliban elements from their strongholds, which although 
effective, also has disastrous consequences for any non-combatants in the 
area. When an enemy element is located, the area must be secured and 
the element neutralized on the ground, and thereby lessening the 
possibility of civilian casualties. As one anonymous writer in Kandahar 
said, “The foreign soldiers don’t fight face to face because they are too 
scared of the Taliban. However, they should fight face to face and not 
send in the aircraft bombers, because doing so they kill civilians.”115  
While airstrikes may prevent U.S./NATO casualties in the immediate 
term, they will almost certainly prolong the conflict. Although exact 
figures are classified, in one month of 2006, Human Rights Watch 
counted more than twice as many airstrikes in Afghanistan than Iraq.116  
This cannot continue without seriously alienating the local populations 
of the exact regions U.S./NATO forces hope to win over. 
As previously shown, the peacekeeper to population ratio in 
Afghanistan is at a dangerous level. In order to better secure troubled 
areas, the security footprint must be increased, but only in tandem with 
increased development works. This will release rural Pashtuns from the 
terror of the Taliban, and the growing dependence on narcotrafficking as 
a viable means of sustenance. 
In fiscal year 2006, the U.S. spent slightly less than one billion dollars 
on development in Afghanistan, or less than forty dollars per Afghan. 
Reportedly most never leaves the U.S., being spent on studies, 
consultants, and administrative costs.117  Of the funds that eventually do 
make it to Afghanistan, near half is spent on maintaining the Kabul to 
Kandahar highway.118  With this in mind, it can be assumed that roughly 
the cost of a fast food meal reaches each Afghan per year. More must be 
spent on the ground improving the lives of average Afghans. 
                                                      
115 Qtd., Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies, Senlis 
Council, London: Senlis, February 2007, 
<www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/018_publication> (May 22 2007). 
116 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: NATO Should Do More to Protect Civilians,” 
October 30 2006, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/30/afghan14475.htm> (May 24 
2007). 
117 By some accounts as much as 86 percent of American aid dollars sent to Afghanistan 
are in fact “phantom aid” (Ann Jones, “ How U.S. dollars disappear in Afghanistan: 
quickly and thoroughly,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 3, 2006, 
<www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/09/03/INGR0KRGMF1.DTL> (May 24 
2007). 
118 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 
CRS Web, 3 November 2006. <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf> (November 15 
2006). 




The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are an interesting 
experiment because their combination of counterinsurgent kinetic and 
non-kinetic foci and objectives, but there are not enough PRTs in the 
field. At present there are 23 PRTs in Afghanistan – less than one per 
province.119  Although significantly more expensive, DRTs (District 
Reconstruction Teams)120 could prove invaluable in approaching many of 
the insurgent and drug related problems that ail Afghanistan, and give 
peacekeepers and development workers a presence visible to all Afghans. 
As the number of stakeholders in the success of a democratic 
Afghanistan increase, the well of despair from which the Taliban draws 
its support will shrink. 
Were these tactics to be adopted, U.S./NATO casualties would 
increase in short-term. But in order to avoid a prolonged insurgency, 
with more Afghan civilian and foreign peacekeeper casualties in the long 
run, a proactive stance must be taken. Without careful study of the 
human terrain in Afghanistan, and a corresponding shift in tactics, 
international forces risk getting stuck in the big muddy there.  
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